

## SKY Harbor Weekly Briefing

### Time to Sweat the Small Stuff?


Much has been made about small cap stock underperformance over the last several years, with assumed drivers that include reduced availability of capital, higher interest rates, persistent labor competition, and a lack of M&A activity, to name a few. Though this dynamic is evident by simply viewing trailing returns of the Russell 2000 Index relative to the S&P 500, a seemingly opposite trend has emerged in US high yield bond markets. In this *Weekly Briefing*, we compare recent “small” vs. “large” bond performance, noting fundamental and technical reasons for the recent divergence, and outlining our rationale for a potential inflection on the horizon.

### The “Magnificent 7”

Coined the “Magnificent 7” by Bank of America strategist Michael Hartnett, this group of mega-cap tech stocks (Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta, Microsoft, Nvidia, and Tesla) has significantly outperformed the market over the last year. The magnitude of their outperformance and disproportionate impact on the S&P 500 (now ~ 30% by market cap) has somewhat distorted performance for the index as a whole. As demonstrated below (left side), **exclusion of the “Magnificent 7” from our proxy of large cap stocks closes a significant portion – though not all – of the outperformance relative to the Russell 2000 Index, our small cap proxy.** In US high yield bond markets, however, performance divergence has been far less notable, even skewing in the opposite direction. In the chart below (right side), we note that “small” bonds (\$350mm outstanding and lower) have outperformed “large” bonds (\$1bn in size or greater) by over 50 bps on a trailing 12-month basis.

### Most, But Not All Large Cap O/P Stems from the “Magnificent 7”


trailing 1-year returns, through Feb 20, 2024



Source: SKY Harbor, UBS, Bloomberg, ICE Data Indices

### US High Yield Returns Clustered; Modestly Favor Smaller Issues

trailing 1-year returns, through Feb 20, 2024




### Rewarding of Risk

As noted in a prior *Weekly Briefing* entitled “[Christmas Came Early](#),” CCC-rated debt outperformed other rating buckets in 2023, largely a function of disinflation progress and “soft landing” enthusiasm, which displaced a base case recession outlook that was so prevalent in 2022. **CCC-rated debt makes up ~ 19% of the “small” bond cohort, nearly twice the relative magnitude found among “large” bonds (~ 11%).** As such, we think part of small issue outperformance over the last year is a function of ratings skew – not dissimilar to the role the “Magnificent 7” played in pulling up the performance of large cap equities relative to their small cap peers – albeit less concentrated.

### Small Bonds Skew Lower on the Credit Rating Spectrum...


data as of February 20, 2024



Source: SKY Harbor, ICE Data Indices

### ...CCCs Have Outperformed Over Last 12 Months

daily data, cumulative returns




## Stronger Fundamentals in Large Structures

From a fundamental perspective, does small issue outperformance appear warranted? To address this question, we present below a time series of default and recovery rates, which show moderate dispersion at present based on data collected since 2005. For simplicity, and to account for issuer size evolution and distortion stemming from large capital structures at times issuing small bonds, we utilize BofA Merrill Lynch's framework, defining "large" and "small" cohorts by face value of bonds outstanding (top and bottom quartiles, respectively). As demonstrated below, **default rates for "small" issuers are running at a level more than twice that of "large" issuers**, while recovery rates on those defaulted bonds have similarly diverged. Despite this, "small" performance has not suffered.


### "Small" Issuers Defaulting at a Higher Rate...

par-weighted default rates, recessions shaded grey



### ...And Posting Weaker Recovery Rates

recovery rates, recessions shaded grey




Source: SKY Harbor, BofA Merrill Lynch, The National Bureau of Economic Research, Bloomberg

## Small Issuers Face Greater Refi Hurdle

Additionally, and as noted in an October '23 *Weekly Briefing* entitled "[Not Yet Up Against a Wall](#)," par-weighted coupons are set to ratchet up from bottom decile levels as issuers are forced to address upcoming maturities, causing concern among some market participants that this repricing will negatively impact fundamental credit ratios on a go-forward basis, which ultimately drive future default rates. As highlighted below, **a greater proportion of "small" bonds are set to mature in the next 24 months, implying greater upward pressure on issuer interest expense relative to the "large" subset**. With existing coupons modestly lower than the index average, "small" issuers appear at greater risk of interest coverage erosion in the coming quarters, all else being equal.


### "Small" Bond Cohort Faces Greater Refi Pressure...

% of size bucket maturing in 24 months or less



### ...Implying a Larger Uptick in Interest Expense

avg. coupon of bonds maturing in 24 months or less



Source: SKY Harbor, ICE Data Indices


## More Stress, Less Pay

We would also highlight that **"small" issues disproportionately fall into the "distressed" category**, commonly defined as bonds with an option-adjusted spread in excess of 1,000 basis points. While the distressed cohort has recently outperformed the balance of the index, likely contributing to "small" bond outperformance, a turn in sentiment may negatively impact this group, which tends to trade with greater volatility than non-distressed bonds.

Finally, in a *Weekly Briefing* from nearly a year ago entitled "[Recalculating Factor Compensation](#)," we noted our aim to generate, on a monthly basis, a regression-derived estimation of compensation per unit risk factor, with differences in credit quality (via weighted average rating factor), tenor (via duration), and liquidity (via bond issue size) constituting ~90% of index option-adjusted spread variability over time, in our view. At the onset of the pandemic, we estimated the illiquidity premium was running at nearly 2x the long-run average, and normalization of that metric led to small issues outperforming large issues and the index in general by over 2,100 bps and 1,450 bps, respectively, in the 35 months ended February 28, 2023. **At present, illiquidity compensation, after adjusting for differences in credit rating and duration, is well below historical norms.** As such, we view smaller issues as generically "rich" in the current market environment.

## "Small" Bonds Disproportionately Distressed


% of size bucket trading wide of 1,000 bps, by face value



Source: SKY Harbor, ICE Data Indices

## Illiquidity Compensation Well Below LT and ST Averages

quarterly data; "Today" is as of most recent month end



## Adjusting our Bias

Higher defaults, lower recoveries, and incremental refi pressure appear at odds with small issue outperformance within US high yield bonds over the last 12-month period, a trend that stands in stark contrast to large cap dominance on the equity side. Though we have historically been willing to overweight the "small" issuer subset – in part due to perceived pricing inefficiencies given a limited buyer base and absence of sell-side coverage – the lack of meaningful illiquidity premiums (in aggregate) continue to dampen our enthusiasm for such securities in the current market environment. As such, we anticipate a continued portfolio shift toward larger and more liquid exposure in the coming months.

## Important Disclosures and Disclaimers

This analysis and the opinions expressed herein are intended solely for institutional and professional investors that are responsible for assessing their own risk tolerances under prevailing market conditions. SKY Harbor Capital Management, LLC ("SKY Harbor") provides this document for informational purposes only. Nothing contained in this document is or should be construed as an advertisement, or an offer to enter any contract, investment advisory agreement, a recommendation to buy or sell securities of any kind, a solicitation of clients, or an offer to invest in any particular fund, product, investment vehicle, or derivative.

This document contains forward-looking statements that are based on SKY Harbor's current views and assumptions. Forward-looking statements such as the findings of our analytical research, our outlook for interest rates, Fed policy, the economy, high yield markets and the like, or our intended adjustments to the portfolios within our strategies are subject to inherent risks, biases and uncertainties that are beyond SKY Harbor's control and may cause actual results to differ materially from the expectations expressed herein.

The information contained herein is subject to change, and SKY Harbor is under no obligation to update any information contained herein. Certain information contained in this document has been obtained from third-party sources and, although believed to be reliable, has not been independently verified, and its accuracy or completeness cannot be guaranteed. SKY Harbor, its affiliates, officers, directors and employees hereby disclaim any liability whatsoever related to the use of this publication or its content and make no express or implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for any particular purpose or use with respect to the data, projections, analysis, content, or conclusions included in this publication.

Investing in securities involves risk of loss and past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. Fixed income securities, especially high yield debt securities, are subject to loss of income and principal arising from credit risk, which is the risk that the issuer will be unable to make interest and principal payments when due. Material risks in investing in high yield debt securities also include, but are not limited to, opportunity cost (the risk that an issuer's credit trends deteriorate resulting in a higher level of compensation demanded by the market relative to the initial investment), interest rate risk, liquidity risk, selection risk, and overall market risk. In general, issuers of high yield debt securities have a greater likelihood of defaulting on the payment of interest or principal than issuers of investment grade bonds. There can be no assurance that the investment objectives described herein will be achieved or that substantial losses can be avoided.

Gross performance results do not reflect the deduction of investment advisory fees, which would reduce an investor's actual return. For example, assume that \$1 million is invested in an account with the Firm, and this account achieves a 6% compounded annualized return, gross of fees, for five years. At the end of five years that account would grow to \$1,338,226 before the deduction of management fees. Assuming management fees of 0.55% per year are deducted annually from the average annual AUM, the value of the account at the end of five years would be \$1,302,846, which is the equivalent of an annual compounded rate of 5.43%. For a ten-year period, the ending dollar values before and after fees would be \$1,790,848 and \$1,697,408, respectively. SKY Harbor's asset-based fees are generally billed monthly or quarterly in arrears. Please refer to the SKY Harbor's ADV Part 2A or applicable Offering Documents for more information on fees. Consultants supplied with gross results are to use this data in accordance with SEC, CFTC, NFA or the applicable jurisdiction's guidelines.

SKY Harbor is not a tax or legal advisor. Prospective investors should consult their tax or legal advisors before making tax-related investment decisions.

The ICE BofA Index data referenced herein is the property of ICE Data Indices, LLC ("ICE BofA") and/or its licensors and has been licensed for use by SKY Harbor. ICE BofA PERMITS USE OF THE ICE BofA INDICES AND RELATED DATA ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, MAKES NO WARRANTIES REGARDING SAME, DOES NOT GUARANTEE THE SUITABILITY, QUALITY, ACCURACY, TIMELINESS, AND/OR COMPLETENESS OF THE BofA INDICES OR ANY DATA INCLUDED IN, RELATED TO, OR DERIVED THEREFROM, ASSUMES NO LIABILITY IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE FOREGOING, AND DOES NOT SPONSOR, ENDORSE, OR RECOMMEND SKY Harbor or ANY OF ITS PRODUCTS OR SERVICES.

© 2024 SKY Harbor. This document may not be reproduced or transmitted, in whole or in part, by any means, to third parties without the prior written consent of SKY Harbor.